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TRENDS IN MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 
FOR UNREPRESENTED ADULTS
A homeless patient with 
no identified surrogate 
who lacks decision-making 
capacity is admitted to 
the hospital with dry 
gangrene of the foot. Initial 
treatments are provided 
based on the “emergency 
exception” for consent. 
Lower limb amputation 
is recommended to avoid 
life-threatening septic 
infection. However, because 
the patient is not yet septic, 
the amputation cannot be 
done without consent based 
on the emergency exception. 
Emergency petition to 
appoint a guardian to 
consent to the amputation 
will likely take too long to 
avoid the septic infection 
that would qualify the 
surgery as emergent. Is there 
an alternative to appointing 
a guardian to represent 
this patient’s preferences 
or best interests in medical 
decision-making? (Colorado Public Guardianship Advisory Committee, 2014)
It’s estimated that, overall, 5.5% of patients in U.S. intensive care units (ICUs) are 
unrepresented [meaning there is not an appropriate method in place for representing 
their medical treatment preferences when they lack decision-making capacity (DMC)] 
(White, et al., 2007). Most unrepresented adults live in hospitals, in nursing homes, 
or are homeless (Pope, 2012a). However, changing demographics (e.g., more aging 
childless persons who have smaller social support networks) point to increasing 
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numbers of cognitively impaired 
individuals whose medical care will 
be impacted by delayed decisions 
related to lack of available surrogates 
to consent on their behalf. Often, this 
results in overtreatment and extended 
stays in acute care settings that expose 
such individuals to iatrogenic harms 
and unnecessary discomforts (Pope, 
2012a, 2012b, 2013).
Current substitute decision-
making practices for patients 
whose recommended treatment is 
not considered emergent include 
consulting an advance directive (i.e., 
a valid living will, verbal advance 
directive, or appointed health care 
agent) or following a valid Physicians 
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment 
(POLST) order. However, advance 
directives and POLST orders would 
need to be completed before the 
patient’s admission in order to be 
useful. Furthermore, most living 
will language provides guidance on 
treatments to provide or withhold 
if a patient is in a terminal or end-
stage condition, or permanently 
unconscious, so this wouldn’t address 
decision-making for unrepresented 
patients who are not in these 
conditions. Regarding POLST forms 
(or Maryland’s MOLST – Medical 
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment 
– form), even if one was completed 
prior to the patient’s admission, it 
is likely that the patient’s condition 
has changed, which warrants a 
reconsideration of the POLST/MOLST 
orders. Thus, health care facilities 
are left with figuring out whether a 
surrogate can be designated, and if 
not, whether applying for guardianship 
is necessary. 
The American Thoracic Society, 
in collaboration with the American 
Geriatric Society, has assembled 
a project committee to develop 
a position statement on medical 
decision-making for unrepresented 
incapacitated patients. At a recent 
meeting, the committee considered a 
number of proposed solutions (Pope, 
2012a), including:
• Promoting preventive measures 
such as having advance care 
planning (ACP) conversations 
with at-risk individuals and 
documenting their health care 
preferences (i.e., in a state 
advance directive registry and 
a patient’s medical record), 
and focusing on appointing 
a surrogate decision-maker, 
if one is available, rather 
than completing the more 
complex living will document. 
Reimbursement now available 
through Medicare for ACP 
conversations may help in this 
area.
• Conducting thorough searches 
for a surrogate before concluding 
that there is no one available 
to serve in this role. Some 
facilities employ a private 
detective agency to conduct such 
searches, offsetting the cost by 
money saved due to avoiding 
guardianship petitions and 
extended stays in the hospital 
caused by lack of an available 
surrogate decision-maker. In 
Maryland, an individual may sign 
an affidavit asserting to being a 
close friend who has maintained 
regular contact with the patient 
sufficient to be familiar with the 
patient’s activities, health, and 
personal beliefs. Some contend 
that emphasizing the person’s 
role as representing the patient’s 
preferences (i.e. “substituted 
decision-making”) rather than 
serving as a medical decision 
maker may assuage concerns that 
such a friend or distant relative 
lacks appropriate authority to 
make medical decisions for the 
patient.
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• Conducting careful decision-
making capacity assessments to 
identify the patient’s preferences, 
to identify an appropriate 
surrogate (if one is available), 
and to determine whether the 
patient is able to make his or her 
own medical treatment decisions. 
As Pope pointed out (2012a, p. 
88), “[w]ith support, time, and 
good communication, seemingly 
unbefriended individuals may be 
able to make decisions that at first 
blush appear not to be possible.”
Assuming these approaches have 
already been implemented, and that 
the number of remaining patients who 
need but lack others’ input for medical 
decision-making is minimized, 
the question remains: how should 
decisions for non-emergent medical 
treatment or medical transfer be made 
for the remaining unrepresented 
patients? Currently, practices vary 
widely from institution to institution 
and from state to state. Alabama, 
Arizona, Connecticut, and North 
Carolina allow the patient’s attending 
physician (often with input from the 
hospital’s ethics committee) to make 
medical decisions (Pope, 2015). 
This has raised concerns about the 
physician’s bias and potential conflict 
of interest. Having ethics committees 
(or multi-disciplinary ad hoc 
committees) weigh in may increase 
logistical burdens but is generally 
favored over an individual clinician 
making decisions for a patient. 
Pope has also suggested involving 
committees external to the institution 
where the patient is receiving care, to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest. 
Individual states have explored their 
own solutions. For example, Florida 
permits a social worker external to an 
institution to serve in this role, with 
oversight from an ethics committee. 
In California, long-term care facilities 
can establish inter-disciplinary teams 
comprised of an attending physician, 
registered nurse with responsibility for 
a resident, a patient representative (if 
available), and other appropriate staff 
to make decisions for unrepresented 
residents (Pope, 2012b). Oregon 
and Nebraska have initiated public 
guardianship programs to address 
widespread concerns with time 
delays and lack of training when 
petitioning for guardians. New York 
recently passed legislation allowing an 
attending physician, with a concurring 
opinion from another physician and 
the facility ethics committee, to 
elect hospice for an unrepresented 
patient (before that, New York statute 
allowed for this mechanism to make 
decisions about “routine medical 
treatment, “major medical treatment,” 
and “withholding/withdrawal of life-
sustaining therapy,” but hospice care 
did not fit in these categories) (Pope, 
2012b). In Maryland, clinicians could 
petition for emergency protective 
services under Rule 10-210, granting 
guardianship for decision-making in 
as quickly as one day. As with other 
guardianship appointment systems, 
turn-around times may vary based on 
region and case loads.
Those caring for patients who 
cannot make their own medical 
decisions and have no one to 
represent them are charged 
with a great responsibility. 
Unfortunately, current 
laws and regulations have 
not always served the best 
interests of these individuals, 
and at times leave hospitals 
as de facto homeless shelters. 
The American Thoracic 
Society position statement on 
medical decision-making for 
unrepresented incapacitated patients is 
expected to address this disparity. It is 
anticipated that this position statement 
will complement the joint policy 
statement on responding to requests 
for potentially inappropriate treatment 
in intensive care units (Bosslet et al., 
2015).
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patient is not being coerced);  
3. “there is no waiting period 
between the patient’s written 
request and the writing of the 
prescription”;  
4. “the attending physician must 
provide a separate form for 
the patient to complete within 
48 hours prior to taking the 
medications”; 
5. any unused medications must be 
properly disposed of; 
6. the law includes forms that 
the physician or patient must 
complete in the statute whereas in 
Oregon the forms are created by 
a state agency; and 
7. the law in California has a sunset 
provision of January 1, 2026 and 
will expire at that time unless 
renewed by the legislature.  
(DWD National Center, 2016)
This last provision indicates that 
the California legislature wanted 
the opportunity to evaluate the law 
after it has been in effect for ten 
years. Since the law passed, the 
California Medical Association has 
prepared a question and answer 
sheet about the law for physicians. 
The Q&A sheet can be found at: 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CMA_
EOLOptionAct_Guidelines.pdf.
This past year approximately 
18 additional states considered or 
are considering passage of PAD 
legislation. The surge in interest in the 
legislation is thought to be a result of 
the highly publicized Youtube video of 
Brittany Maynard who, at the age of 
29 and diagnosed with an aggressive 
form of brain cancer, moved to Oregon 
so that she could take advantage of 
that state’s PAD law. Among the many 
states that considered PAD legislation 
this year was Maryland. This was 
the fourth time such legislation had 
been introduced into the Maryland 
General Assembly. The first two 
were in 1995 and 1996, during the 
highly controversial actions of Dr. 
Jack Kevorkian in Michigan, the third 
was in 2015. The most recent bill, the 
Richard E. Israel and Roger “Pip” 
Moyer End-of-Life Option Act, was 
introduced in both the House and the 
Senate in the 2016 legislative session 
by Maryland Senator Ronald Young 
(S.B. 418) and state Delegate Shane 
Pendergrass (HB 404). The bill was 
modeled after the Oregon law and 
includes the same eligibility and 
physician oversight requirements as 
the Oregon legislation. 
 A joint hearing by the House Health 
and Government Operations and 
Judiciary Committees was held on 
the House bill on Feb. 19, 2016, and 
a hearing by the Senate 
Judicial Proceedings 
Committee on SB 418 
was held on Feb. 25, 
2016. Hearings on both 
bills were packed with 
emotional testimony 
by those both for and 
against the legislation. 
Shortly after the hearings, 
Senator Young withdrew 
the Senate bill from 
consideration by the 
Judicial Proceedings 
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING LEGISLATION:  
FARES WELL IN CALIFORNIA BUT FAILS IN MARYLAND
Physician Assisted Dying (PAD) 
legislation continues to be proposed in 
a number of states around the country 
with varying degrees of success in 
terms of passage.  These laws permit 
physicians to prescribe medication to 
a terminally ill adult to use to end his 
or her life. Most recently, California 
passed such legislation. Called the 
End of Life Option Act, the bill took 
effect on June 9, 2016. As a result, 
California will join four other states 
that have legalized PAD including 
Washington, Oregon, Vermont and 
Montana. The California law, as is 
the case in most other states, closely 
follows the contours of the Oregon 
law. Oregon was the first state to 
pass PAD legislation and it has been 
in effect now for over 18 years. 
Features of the Oregon law adopted 
by California include the following 
eligibility requirements: the patient 
must be a resident of the state, 18 
years of age or older, diagnosed with 
a terminal illness that will lead to 
death within 6 months, and mentally 
competent to make and communicate 
health care decisions. The patient’s 
diagnosis and mental capacity must be 
certified by the patient’s physician and 
a consulting physician.  In addition, 
both laws require that the patient make 
two oral requests at least 15 days 
apart, and a written request to his or 
her physician. Patients must also be 
able to self-administer the medication. 
While California’s law is substantially 
similar to Oregon’s, the California law 
differs in a few ways, including that:  
1. it explicitly permits people who 
do not speak English to use an 
interpreter when interacting with 
their physician; 
2. it requires the attending physician 
to “discuss the request for 
medications with the patient... 
alone” (in order to be sure the 
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Committee due to a lack of support. At 
about the same time Del. Pendergrass 
indicated that she would not bring the 
House bill up for a vote. According 
to news stories about the legislative 
process, the bill was strongly opposed 
by the Catholic church and disability 
rights advocates. They testified that 
the law did not provide sufficient 
protections for the disabled and 
vulnerable who often do not have 
enough resources for good medical 
care and may be coerced into asking 
doctors to help them end their lives 
prematurely.  Others argued that such 
legislation does not go far enough in 
ensuring access to effective palliative 
care that would obviate a terminally ill 
individual accessing lethal medication 
to hasten his or her death. Advocates 
for PAD argued that it will allow 
patients to avoid the pain and suffering 
that often accompany the last few 
months or weeks of life and will likely 
push to have the bill introduced again 
next year.
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PHILOSOPHER’S CORNER: REASONS 
AND THE MESSINESS OF MORALITY
On a common, simplistic picture of morality, there is really only one large 
class of moral considerations that need to be understood.  This class includes 
things like duties, obligations, rights, virtues and vices, right and wrong, 
goodness and badness, and likely some others I’m forgetting.  And these 
concepts are related to one another in a fairly straightforward way: If I have 
a duty or obligation to do something, then someone else has a right that I do 
it, it’s right to do, wrong not to do, it’s what the virtuous person would do, 
and is morally good.  Call this view “moral monism.”  
It would be very nice if moral monism were true.  It would make 
the world of morality clean, understandable, and straightforward.  
Unfortunately, it’s almost certainly false.  The moral world is messy, 
and we have to deal with it.  That’s why I want to discuss a concept that 
contemporary philosophers are particularly keen on, but in a way that I think 
is helpful for those of us who regularly deal with the difficult, messy world 
of real moral problems: this concept is that of a ”reason.”
We use the language of something’s “being a reason” in both a normative, 
justificatory sense, as well as a descriptive, motivational sense. In moral 
philosophy, though, we are mostly concerned with the former: we want 
to know what considerations justify some action or attitude, and are less 
concerned with what considerations actually motivate an action.  What we 
are concerned with when we focus on normative reasons, then, are those 
“considerations that count in favor of a thing.”  Reasons, then, come cheap: 
that my coffee is tasty is a reason to drink it, that the sunshine is lovely is a 
reason to go outside, and that it would save her life is a reason to intubate a 
patient.
Notice, though, that not all of these reasons are of the same general kind. 
That last one, in particular, seems more important, and it is: while coffee- 
and sunshine-based reasons are merely prudential, rescue-reasons are moral.  
And moral reasons, we think, play a particular kind of special role in our 
deliberation.
Thus far, this may all seem like the philosopher’s ivory-tower 
specification of something painfully obvious: considerations count in favor 
of and against doing things, and some of these considerations are moral. 
What is important, though, is that really embracing the reality of a world full 
of reasons to act, be or feel certain things makes clear how truly messy the 
moral world must be.  Let’s look first at a common philosopher’s thought-
experiment to see how this is so, before turning to the medical context.
In Introduction to Ethics classes, many philosophers will present students 
with “Trolley Problems,” designed to elicit intuitions that place them into 
moral theoretic camps.  In the basic case, a runaway trolley is barreling 
down a track, on which five innocent strangers have been tied.  However, 
you happen to see this and happen to be standing at a switch, which would 
divert the train to a sidetrack.  On the sidetrack, a single innocent stranger 
is tied.  So, you must either throw the switch, which will result in a single 
person’s death, or let the train go, which will result in the death of five 
people.  
Cont. on page 6
CORRECTION
In the Fall 2015 issue of The 
Newsletter, we included a 
link to Dr. Shahid Aziz's blog, 
"You Deserve a Good Death." 
That link was incomplete. 
The full link is: http://
youdeserveagooddeath.blogspot.
com/
6  Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter
In this simple case, most people say that you morally ought to throw the switch, or at least that it would be 
permissible to do so, which is evidence (so says the philosopher) that many of us believe that consequences matter – 
perhaps quite a lot – which is something like saying that there is a general principle of beneficence which commands 
promoting good consequences, even if that involves causing specific harms. However, a minority of students in every 
class does dissent against the prevailing opinion, arguing that one must not actively kill someone (and throwing the 
switch constitutes killing), even when failing to do so requires letting more people die.  
There are lots of arguments about how we should reason in the Trolley Case, but I’m not going to discuss them here. 
I’m less worried about the right answer, and more worried about the general push so many people seem to feel toward 
figuring out “the right answer” regarding what to do, so that we can call it a day.  If I were an ethics advisor, and 
the person from the Trolley Case came to me – distressed – for advice about whether to pull the lever, coming back 
with a straightforward judgment about what he should do would not seem appropriate.  Suppose I told the advisee, 
“Your reluctance to throw the switch stems from your recognition that one generally ought not to harm another – we 
generally ought to be nonmaleficent.  However, we also ought to promote the good, especially in rescue cases, and so 
ought to be beneficent.  Since the good you could promote is so much greater than the harm you would cause in doing 
so, you clearly ought to throw the switch in this case, and you should not feel bad about doing so.”  I think that, even 
if I were right about how to weigh the relevant moral principles, this would be fairly bad advice.  And that’s because it 
takes what is, in reality, a difficult case, and pretends away the difficulty.  
Any morally interesting case will be difficult, which means that there will be competing goods, principles and 
reasons involved.  Even in the Trolley Case, there is a good reason not to throw the switch – and that reason can be 
variously described in terms of our duty not to harm another, or a basic right of all people not to be seen as expendable 
in pursuit of the greater good, or likely in yet other ways.  And the fact that throwing the switch harms another for 
the sake of the greater good is a genuine moral consideration that doesn’t disappear, even if it is defeated in moral 
deliberation.  What’s more is that such a reason demands a particular kind of response, which may be sadness or even 
guilt on the part of the one who acts against it; and it may even be a mark of good character to see an overridden 
reason as requiring certain reactions.
All of this complication was able to be raised in the artificial (and frankly, silly) case of the trolley, so we can only 
imagine how complicated genuinely difficult moral problems are.  But we don’t have to imagine, do we?  As hospital 
ethics committee members, you likely have seen more than your fair share of genuine moral dilemmas, moral tragedy, 
and the general havoc reaped by unresponded-to reasons.  
A case-type that regularly haunts me, and that has received attention in this very publication, is that of the very sick, 
extremely preterm infant, who will not survive, but whose parents are demanding that “everything be done.”  This 
sort of case likely often ends up in front of the ethics committee, and I am sure that most committee members do not 
believe that there will be an easy, “tidy” solution.  They may, however, feel the need to genuinely solve the problem, 
and what I want to do here is provide permission to back away from a strong reading of that phrase.  A committee can 
provide action guidance without giving the impression that the answer is obvious, or that doing the right thing is all 
that matters.  For every interesting case, there will be a multitude of very real moral reasons in favor of competing 
actions and attitudes, which means that not all reasons can be responded to.  Suppose that, after extensive deliberation, 
your committee decides that the parents’ wishes must, for now, be honored, despite the infant’s suffering and the lack 
of any indication that it will survive: this decision, even if correct, does not mean that there aren’t very strong reasons 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.  And even in “normative defeat,” these reasons may do real work: they can 
explain the pain and moral residue felt by the health care team; perhaps they might demand certain attitudes toward 
the child, the parents, and the decision; and it may well be a mark of good character if members of the health care team 
find the situation difficult and emotional.
In this case and any other, such an admission does not mean that the ethics committee shouldn’t recommend what 
it does; what it means is that the recommendation doesn’t solve the problem in a complete sense that should make 
everyone perfectly comfortable.  It provides a way forward, but that way – even if correct – may yet be difficult and 
morally messy.  Being sensitive to this messiness may help committees and other ethics consultants to provide their 
judgment in a way that doesn’t imply clarity or obviousness, and which makes way for a variety of responses to the 
extant reasons, including sadness, reluctance, and even grief.
Travis N. Rieder, PhD   -   Assistant Director of Education Initiatives & Research Scholar  
Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University
Philosopher's Corner  Cont. from page 5
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HIPAA RULING’S IMPACT ON FILMING PATIENTS 
FOR PUBLIC BROADCAST
On April 21, 2016, the Department 
of Health and Human Services’ 
(DHHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
announced that they had reached a 2.2 
million dollar settlement with New 
York Presbyterian Hospital (NYP) 
as a penalty for allowing the film 
crew of ABC’s “NY Med” television 
series to access patients’ protected 
health information (PHI) without 
prior authorization. One of those 
patients was Mark Chanko, who died 
at NYP after being hit by a sanitation 
truck while trying to cross the street. 
Unbeknownst to Mr. Chanko’s family 
during his hospitalization in 2011, 
his care was filmed, including scenes 
of his attempted resuscitation, and 
he was featured in an episode of NY 
Med that aired sixteen months later, 
in August 2012. Although his face 
was blurred to mask his identity to 
viewers, Mr. Chanko’s widow viewed 
a recorded version of the program 
months after her husband’s death and 
recognized him by his words and the 
interactions with the clinicians caring 
for him. One of the physicians wore 
a microphone that captured dialogue, 
including Mr. Chanko asking if his 
wife had been notified, and excerpts of 
the conversation in which the doctor 
informed the Chanko family about the 
unsuccessful resuscitation attempts 
preceding Mr. Chanko’s death. 
Describing her reaction to the NY 
Med episode, Mrs. Chanko told a New 
York Times reporter: “I hear them 
saying his blood pressure is falling. I 
hear them getting out the paddles and 
then I hear them saying, ‘O.K., are 
you ready to pronounce him?’ … I 
saw my husband die before my eyes” 
(Ornstein, January 2, 2015). 
The Chanko family filed a 
complaint with DHHS three years 
ago, culminating in the recent 
settlement with NYP, in which OCR 
determined that NYP committed an 
“egregious” violation of the Privacy 
Rule (Ornstein, April 21, 2016). In 
addition to the monetary penalty, the 
hospital will undergo staff training and 
be subject to audit. The Chanko family 
also sued ABC, the hospital, and the 
chief surgical resident in charge at 
the time for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and they sued the 
surgical resident for breach of doctor-
patient confidentiality. The New York 
State Court of Appeals dismissed 
the claim of intentional inflection of 
emotional distress but allowed the 
suit for doctor-patient confidentiality 
breach to proceed. 
The Chanko family and opponents 
to programs that allow patient filming 
without prior consent and privacy 
release (i.e., HIPAA authorization) 
argue that privacy violations like 
these threaten the trust patients place 
in their health care providers, a trust 
that is central to the patient-provider 
relationship. Some argue that filming 
in the ER should not be permitted at 
all given that requiring permission 
prior to filming does not go far enough 
to protect vulnerable patients because 
patients who are seriously ill or injured 
often lack the capacity to provide 
informed consent. They are concerned 
that the rule permitting filming only 
after consent may perpetuate ethically 
problematic behavior to seek consent 
from patients who are not in a position 
to give such permission. (Typically, 
patients featured in such programming 
can withdraw content to be featured 
but are not offered the right to review 
content and consent or object to its 
inclusion, for logistical and editorial 
control reasons).
Proponents of the status quo (i.e., 
allowing filming in health care 
settings for the purpose of creating 
public broadcasts, documentaries, or 
films, with the prior consent of the 
patient or surrogate or blurring the 
identity of those who don’t provide 
consent) maintain that there is 
important educational value in such 
programming.
The OCR has issued a “Q&A” about 
this topic (FAQ 2023, http://www.
hhs.gov/), clarifying that members of 
the media (including film crews) may 
only enter into patient treatment areas 
if prior authorization is obtained from 
patients whose PHI will be accessible, 
or, if the filming is being done on 
behalf of the provider (such as for 
internal training or public relations 
purposes), certain protections are 
in place, such as having a HIPAA 
business associate agreement in 
place with the film crew. Dr. Joel 
Geiderman of Cedars-Sinai Medical 
Center in Los Angeles told NYT 
reporter Charles Ornstein (April 21, 
2016) that this could signal the end 
of real-life medical programming: "I 
think this will have a chilling effect 
on hospitals going forward … Any 
hospital legal counsel worth his salt or 
any P.R. director would be committing 
malpractice in order to allow it to 
occur. It's now embodied in a federal 
directive."
REFERENCES
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COMMENTS FROM AN 
ECONOMIST & BIOETHICIST
This case asks the overall question:  
Is the hospital ethically justified in 
offering this genetic test free to infants 
born in the hospital?  To address 
it, we begin by asking several prior 
questions.
First, what is the benefit to the 
newborn from the test?
The benefit is the information 
that the child might have an adverse 
reaction to certain drugs that might be 
administered sometime in the future.
Second, why give the test at birth?
Childbirth is a stressful event, and 
the newborn period is a bad time to 
ask parents to make decisions about 
genetic screening tests.  Public health 
newborn screening (NBS) programs 
understand this; they test all newborns 
in the hospital only because they 
must quickly identify children who 
will suffer harm if not diagnosed 
and treated soon after birth.  In the 
case at hand, we aren’t given much 
information about the drugs involved, 
the nature of the adverse reactions, 
and the probability they will occur in 
a person with a positive test result.  
But the two specific drugs mentioned 
should not be given to infants and 
young children (codeine, SSRIs).  
Why do the test in the birthing 
hospital if there is no urgency?  The 
test can be offered later as part of 
normal pediatric or adult care if it 
is worth doing.  This is the reason 
why this genetic test is not a suitable 
candidate for a public health newborn 
screening program; it would definitely 
not meet the criteria for addition to 
the RUSP and is also very unlikely to 
be added by any individual state.  The 
case description states that the test will 
be separate from other NBS tests, but 
doing the test during the same period 
may still cause confusion; a positive 
result on a public health NBS test 
requires immediate parental action to 
avoid harm, whereas a positive result 
on this test does not.  
Third, why test at all?
The test’s potential benefit is only 
realized if its results are available 
and used to make the right clinical 
decision if and when the person who 
tests positive needs a problematic 
drug.  This is quite likely to fail 
to happen, especially if the test is 
done in childhood.  Today’s medical 
record-keeping systems don’t provide 
seamless access to patient information 
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an 
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit 
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the 
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify 
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to  
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
CASE PRESENTATION
ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS QUESTION FROM A MID-ATLANTIC HOSPITAL
A large, Mid-Atlantic non-profit teaching hospital is considering offering optional testing (at no charge) to all infants 
born at the hospital to test for specific cytochrome P450 enzyme and other pharmacogenetically relevant variants (that 
is, genetic changes that have to do with how individuals metabolize certain medications). The test would be done via a 
buccal swab shortly after birth after obtaining parental consent, and would be separate from newborn screening or any 
related tests. No other testing and no research would be done with these samples.  These genetic variants are known 
to alter medication metabolism in ways that place individuals at risk for adverse drug reactions or lack of efficacy. In 
this analysis, specific variants with the strongest scientific and clinical evidence related to the metabolism of codeine, 
some Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), and several other medications would be tested.  By offering such 
preemptive testing to newborns, it's hoped that significant future adverse drug events or lack of treatment efficacy could 
be avoided.  The rationale for offering the pharmacogenetic screening test to infants born at the hospital at no cost is 
that more infants would be tested, as fewer parents would consent if they had to pay for the screening out of pocket, and 
insurance would not likely cover the test. The rationale involves democratizing this type of screening, as such tests are 
typically only available to those with means and education.  Some clinicians at the hospital raise questions about whether 
offering this optional testing is ethically justified. One concern is if, unlike in this case, it were to be included as part of 
the universal newborn screening process. The Recommended Uniform Screening Panel (RUSP) of the American College 
of Medical Genetics does not currently include these tests as part of their recommended newborn screening panel, though 
many states include tests that are not part of RUSP.  They query the ethics committee to weigh in on the pros and cons in 
this hypothetical case.
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across providers and throughout a 
lifetime.  It would be a challenge 
for any parent to keep track of this 
type of information; the low-income 
parents who are of concern in this 
case are especially likely to face more 
urgent challenges.  Moreover, even if 
the critical moment actually arrives 
and the information is available, in 
today’s health care system there is no 
guarantee that the clinician will know 
what to do with it.   
In my opinion, there isn’t a good 
case for routinely screening healthy 
people – especially newborns 
– for this genetic trait.  It may 
make sense to screen population 
subgroups, however.  For example, 
children and teens being treated for 
depression might be tested before 
being prescribed an SSRI.  Children 
facing surgery might be tested if 
it is thought that avoiding codeine 
would complicate pain relief.  People 
with chronic conditions might be 
tested if they are likely to need a 
problematic drug on an emergency 
basis, with no time to wait for test 
results.  It might even make sense to 
test some newborns in the hospital, 
if they are born with symptoms that 
are likely to trigger the use of such 
drugs in the very near future.  In these 
situations, the test would meet the 
usual requirement that tests only be 
recommended in clinical practice if 
the results have immediate clinical 
significance.
It doesn’t necessarily follow that the 
testing should be actively discouraged 
for people who want it and can pay 
for it, but at this time the benefits are 
too contingent for it to be promoted as 
standard of care for everyone.   
Fourth, even so, can it actually be 
unethical to offer the test to people at 
no charge?  
The benefit may be small or 
nonexistent, but what’s the harm, if 
the test is voluntary and free?
My first reaction in reviewing this 
case was surprise that a proposal for 
free testing could get far enough for 
this question to arise.  When many 
hospitals are struggling to provide 
care that meets basic quality standards 
without going bankrupt, wouldn’t the 
administration say “Do genetic testing 
for free?  With our operating deficit?  
You’re kidding, right?”  After all, the 
newborn’s family may not be paying 
for the testing, but someone is, and 
there is always something else that 
money could be used for.
The distribution of a hospital’s 
resources – where they come from 
and how they are used in caring for 
patients – is an organizational ethics 
issue.  Hospital decision-makers 
should always be attentive to their 
stewardship obligations when making 
resource allocation decisions.  Thus it 
is certainly appropriate to ask whether 
it is ethical to use the resources 
provided to the hospital by public and 
private insurance programs, self-
paying patients, and charitable donors 
to fund a free service.  We aren’t 
given information about the cost of 
the testing but genetic testing is not 
cheap.  A test of this type could cost 
$50 or more per infant just for the test 
kit and processing, and there would be 
other staff costs for administering the 
test program.  In this case, the stated 
rationale of “democratizing access to 
the test” does not seem compelling, 
since the benefit to the recipients 
isn’t very great.  It seems likely 
that there are other health-related 
services that could be provided to 
low-income families of newborns, or 
to other deserving patient categories, 
that would be of greater benefit – or 
the hospital could simply reduce its 
charges.  
Mary Ann Baily, PhD
Hastings Center Fellow
COMMENTS FROM A 
PEDIATRICIAN, LAWYER, & 
BIOETHICIST
The proposed genetic testing 
that would occur in the newborn 
period and would be available to all 
babies born in this institution raises 
many of the same issues currently 
faced by state newborn screening 
programs:  what types of screening 
should be offered, what results should 
be returned to parents, and should  
parental consent be obtained prior 
to newborn screening?  Another 
issue that has presented a significant 
challenge for state newborn screening 
programs in recent years has been 
whether parental consent should 
be required for the retention and 
secondary use of residual newborn 
screening dried blood samples (DBS).  
Rather than address points made by 
Mary Ann Baily about this case, I am 
opting to comment, instead, on this 
broader issue of newborn screening 
and implications for research.
The purpose of newborn screening 
is to identify infants with certain 
heritable conditions, such as 
phenylketonuria, sickle cell disease, 
and cystic fibrosis, so that appropriate 
treatment can be initiated, and 
the effects of the condition can be 
ameliorated, thereby preventing 
disability and/or death.  An estimated 
1 in 300 babies born in the United 
States has one of the newborn 
screening conditions, and it has 
been estimated that 12,500 children 
with serious metabolic, endocrine, 
hematologic, or functional disorders 
are identified through newborn 
screening each year in this country. 
Shortly after birth, almost all of 
the 4 million babies born each year 
in the United States, whether born at 
home or in a hospital, have several 
drops of blood drawn from their 
heels.  This blood is collected on a 
newborn screening card, and when the 
blood has dried, the card is sent to the 
state newborn screening laboratory 
for testing.  In order to ensure that a 
sufficient amount of blood is available 
for testing, more blood is collected 
than is necessary for newborn 
screening testing, and therefore, after 
Cont. on page 10
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newborn screening testing has been 
completed, residual dried blood 
remains.
DBS have a broad range of 
potential secondary uses, including 
newborn screening program quality 
assurance and quality improvement 
activities, test validation, and the 
development of new newborn 
screening tests. They also can be 
used for other types of public health 
surveillance, such as the evaluation of 
prenatal exposure to environmental 
toxins,  and biomedical research 
unrelated to newborn screening.  
Most importantly, DBS are a 
vital component of the continued 
successful operation of state newborn 
screening programs.    
Historically, parental consent was 
not required for the retention and 
secondary use of DBS.  However, 
the research use of de-identified 
DBS without parental permission 
has been controversial in some 
states and led to litigation against 
the state departments of health in 
Texas, Minnesota, and Indiana as 
well as the destruction of millions 
of archived DBS.   In the past, under 
federal human subjects research 
protection regulations (the Common 
Rule), de-identified blood and tissue 
samples, including DBS, were not 
considered human subjects research, 
and the federal regulations governing 
human subjects research, including 
the requirement to obtain informed 
consent prior to participation in 
biomedical research, did not apply.
In 2014, however, the 
Newborn Screening Saves Lives 
Reauthorization Act was enacted.  
Section 12 of this law created an 
exception to the definition of human 
subjects under the Common Rule 
and determined that for purposes of 
federally funded research, research 
conducted using DBS would be 
considered human subjects research, 
whether or not the samples were 
de-identified.  This change in the 
definition of human subjects is 
significant because it means that the 
human subjects research protections, 
including the requirement to obtain 
informed consent, will apply to the 
research use of de-identified DBS.  
In 2015, sweeping changes to the 
Common Rule were proposed that 
would require informed consent for 
the research use of all blood and 
tissue samples, regardless of their 
identifiability.  At the time of this 
writing, final rules have not yet been 
promulgated.
Prior to the passage of the 
Newborn Screening Saves Lives 
Reauthorization Act, there were 
serious questions about how well 
parents were being informed about 
state policies related to the retention 
and secondary use of their children’s 
DBS and whether the option to 
opt-out of participation was a 
meaningful one.  Nevertheless, the 
previous practice of retaining DBS 
for secondary use in a de-identified 
manner made DBS available 
for important public health and 
biomedical research that may not be 
possible going forward and with no 
demonstrated harm to the research 
participants.
The requirement to obtain parental 
consent to use de-identified DBS 
for research will have a profound 
impact on newborn screening.  Most 
importantly, this definition will hinder 
the development of new newborn 
screening tests.  Although it may 
increase perceived parent autonomy 
over the use of their children’s 
DBS, it will strike an improper 
balance between autonomy and the 
facilitation of valuable research.  
Although respect for persons will be 
enhanced if parental autonomy over 
the use of the samples is increased, 
there have been no demonstrated 
harms to infants or their families 
from the secondary research use of 
DBS, and the increased autonomy 
will come at significant cost in that 
the development of new newborn 
screening tests will be hampered.  
The increase in autonomy will not 
lead to decreased harm since there 
has been no harm demonstrated 
with the historical practices and will 
jeopardize important public health 
activities.
Rather than require parental 
consent for the secondary research 
use of all DBS, regardless of their 
identifiability, a better option would 
have been to require that parents be 
informed about state policies related 
to the retention and secondary use 
of DBS and that parents be given 
meaningful options to decline to 
participate.  In this way, parental 
autonomy could be respected without 
such a significant cost to the research 
enterprise, and a better balance 
between autonomy and the value of 
research could be struck.
Note: This commentary is adapted 
from Public Comments I submitted in 
response to the NPRM for Revisions 
to the Common Rule.
Michelle Huckaby Lewis, MD, JD
Research Scholar
Berman Institute of Bioethics
Johns Hopkins University
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
JUNE
21 (12N-1:15P) 
"Ethics for Lunch" Panel Discussion: Bias Towards Patients in Pain, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Hospital Ethics 
Committee & Consultation Service, Sheik Zayed Tower room 2117 (the Arcade), Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, MD 
http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/efl 15-16 Ethics.  
JULY 
11-12
International Bioethics Summer School, sponsored by the New York Society for Ethical Culture, New York, NY. Website:  
http://summerschool.globalbioethics.org/. 
22-23
Pediatric Bioethics Conference: Autism Re-examined: Ethical Challenges in Care, Support, Research and Inclusion, 
sponsored by Treuman Katz Center for Pediatric Bioethics, Seattle, WA. Website:  http://www.seattlechildrens.org/
research/initiatives/bioethics/events/pediatric-bioethics-conference/. 
28-30
Conflict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for Healthcare, Sponsored by the Center for Conflict Resolution in 
Healthcare, LLC, Memphis, TN. Website:  http://www.healthcare-mediation.net. 
AUGUST 
1-5
2016 Annual Meeting, International Neuroethics Society, Seattle, WA. Website:  https://uw.cloud-cme.com/Ap2.
aspx?EID=3390&P=5#. 
28-September 3
2016 Penn State Medical Humanities Scholars Colloquium, sponsored by the Department of Humanities of Penn State 
College of Medicine, Hershey, PA. For more information, e-mail kienlecenter@hmc.psu.edu.
SEPTEMBER 
15-16
Sixth Annual Western Michigan University Medical Humanities Conference, sponsored by the Medical Humanities 
Workgroup at Western Michigan University. Website:   http://www.wmich.edu/medicalhumanities/events/conference. 
16 (8A-12N)
Cultivating an Ethical and Equity Lens in Clinical Care, sponsored by Social Work at Kennedy Krieger Institute, 
Conference center at Sheppard Pratt, Baltimore, MD. For more information, e-mail friend@kennedykrieger.org. 
OCTOBER 
6-9
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities’ 18th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC. Website: http://www.asbh.org. 
14-15
Hastening Death by Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: Clinical, Legal, Ethical, Religious and Family Perspectives, 
co-sponsored by Seattle University School of Law, Seattle, WA. Website:  http://law.seattleu.edu/continuing-legal-
education/upcoming-programs/perspectives-on-vsed. 
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law and 
Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate 
and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational 
and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to 
achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to 
assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general 
public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from affiliate mem-
bers who provide additional financial support.
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